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Abstract
We develop a model in which the heterogeneous ﬁr m si na ni n d u s t r y
choose their modes of organization and the location of their subsidiaries or
suppliers. We assume that the principals of a ﬁrm are constrained in the
nature of the contracts they can write with suppliers or employees. Our
main result concerns the sorting of ﬁrms with diﬀerent productivity levels
into diﬀerent organizational forms. We use the model to examine the
implications of falling trade costs for the relevant prevalence of outsourcing
and foreign direct investment.
JEL Classiﬁcation: L22, F23, D23
Keywords: outsourcing, direct foreign investment, theory of the ﬁrm,
intra-ﬁrm trade
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The term “globalization” applies most aptly to a description of the modern manufacturing
processes in many industries. Rather than specializing in the production of diﬀerent
goods from start to ﬁnish, countries increasingly contribute bits of value added to goods
that end up being quite multinational in their origin. The process of vertical specialization
lies behind the rapid growth in international trade of intermediate inputs, components,
and specialized producer services, which has far outpaced in recent years the growth of
world trade in ﬁnal goods.1
Vertical specialization takes two primary forms. Firms may procure specialized com-
ponents or services from arms-length providers under contractual arrangements, or they
may undertake the various production and assembly activities within the boundaries of
as i n g l eﬁrm by engaging in foreign direct investment (FDI). Borga and Zeile (2001) and
Hanson et al. (2001, 2002) document and analyze the substantial rise in intra-ﬁrm trade
in intermediate inputs that has taken place within multinational corporations. Contrac-
tual dealings are more diﬃcult to isolate in the trade data, but the business press is
replete with stories about foreign outsourcing.
In this paper, we develop a model that can be used to study the underlying causes
of the growth of vertical specialization in trade and especially the form that such trade
takes in diﬀerent industries. We model the endogenous choice of organizational form by
principals who are unable to monitor all of the actions undertaken by their agents. We
consider an industry with many ﬁrms distinguished by their potential productivity. Each
principal that enters the industry acquires the technology to produce a diﬀerentiated
consumer good. But production requires the cooperation of a skilled agent who has the
1A burgeoning empirical literature documents the rapid growth of world trade in intermediate inputs
and the increasing extent of vertical specialization. See, for example, Campa and Goldberg (1997),
Feenstra (1998), Hummels et al. (1998), Hummels et al. (2001), Feenstra and Hanson (2002), Borga
and Zeile (2001), Yeats (2001), and Hanson et al. (2001, 2002).
1know-how to produce an essential component or service. The principal may hire the
agent to manage a “parts division” or else contract with an entrepreneur to serve as
independent supplier. The principal also faces the choice of whether to engage the agent
as manager or supplier in its home country or to seek to import the intermediate inputs
from a subsidiary or supplier located in a foreign land.
Our model incorporates several important trade-oﬀst h a taﬁrm faces in its choice of
location and organizational form. First, a principal who operates a vertically-integrated
ﬁrm may be better able to monitor her partner than one who deals at arms length. We
capture this notion by assuming that a principal can observe a manager’s eﬀorts on some
fraction of tasks, but she cannot monitor the eﬀorts of an independent contractor at all.
Moreover, the ability to monitor may vary with proximity. We assume that a principal
is able to observe a manager’s eﬀorts in a larger fraction of tasks when the manager’s
division is located near to the ﬁrm’s headquarters as compared to when it is located
across national borders.
Second, the contracts that the principal can use to motivate her agent may diﬀer
in the alternative organizational forms. We do not attempt to derive the restrictions
on contracting from ﬁrst principals, but rather we imbue the alternative contractual
relationships with realistic diﬀerences. In particular, we assume that a principal cannot
ask an employee to post a bond which will be forfeited in case his eﬀorts to serve the
principal fail. Nor can the principal ask an employee to front the costs of inputs that will
be put at risk in the production-sharing relationship. Rather, the principal structures a
contract for the manager that pays him a non-negative wage provided that he performs
satisfactorily on tasks that the principal can monitor and a bonus that he receives if the
project succeeds. In an outsourcing relationship, the principal similarly cannot ﬁne an
entrepreneur for failing to deliver acceptable components (or, at least, the size of any bond
that can be posted by a supplier is limited). The supply contract speciﬁes a payment by
the principal that will be paid no matter how the project turns out (for example, to defray
2the entrepreneur’s expense for investing in the project and to compensate his eﬀorts),
and an amount that will be paid in return for delivery of acceptable components. An
important diﬀerence between the organizational forms arises from the assumption that
the principal bears the cost of labor, capital, and material inputs in an integrated ﬁrm,
whereas the entrepreneur pays these costs at least initially when he operates a legally
distinct entity.
Our model bears a familial relationship to previous research on the organization of
the ﬁrm and optimal design of contracts for managers. This is a large literature, so we
mention only two of many related papers. Holmström and Milgrom (1991) have modeled
the choice of organizational form in a setting in which an agent must perform multiple
tasks for the principal, some of which can be better observed than others. But their
emphasis is on externalities in contract design; that is, on how the incentives provided
for one task reﬂect the diﬃculty of measuring performance on others. They apply their
reasoning to asset ownership, and show that “high-powered incentives” should be more
common when the agent owns the productive asset (outsourcing relationship) than when
the principal owns the asset (employment relationship). In our model too the optimal
contract for a potential supplier often provides higher-powered incentives than the opti-
mal contract for a manager, but this has more to do with the restrictions we place on
payments from the agent to the principal and on our assumptions about who initially
bears the cost of labor, capital, and material inputs.
Like us, Horn et al. (1995) study the design of optimal incentive contracts for man-
agers in a world of international trade. However, they do not consider the choice between
vertical integration and arms-length dealing. Rather, they focus on whether international
trade, by increasing the degree of competition in product markets, brings welfare gains
t h a tc a nb ea s s o c i a t e dw i t hi n c r e a s e de ﬀort by the manager and improved internal eﬃ-
ciency of the ﬁrm.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we consider
3the choice of organizational form by a principal with a given potential productivity. The
principal can manufacture a ﬁxed quantity of ﬁnal goods if she can obtain the necessary
intermediate inputs. The inputs must be produced by a skilled partner, who may manage
a division of the principal’s ﬁrm or head an independent supplier. The ability of the
partner to deliver suitable inputs is not assured, but depends on the partner’s eﬀorts
in a variety of tasks. If the principal hires the agent as an employee, she can monitor
the agent’s eﬀorts in a fraction of these tasks. If the agent is hired as an independent
contractor, no monitoring is possible. In either case, the principal designs an optimal
contract subject to the constraints described above, and oﬀers it to an agent with given
outside opportunities on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
Our main result in Section 2 – which allows for no choice of location – concerns the
relationship between the principal’s potential revenues and her preferred organizational
form. We show that outsourcing is preferred by principals who have very high or reason-
ably low potential revenues, whereas vertical integration may oﬀer the greatest expected
proﬁts to a principal whose potential revenues fall in an intermediate range.
In Section 3, we illustrate our result from Section 2 for a special case in which there
is a piecewise linear relationship between eﬀort on a task and its contribution to the
probability of success of the venture. Then we introduce the locational dimension of the
principal’s decision problem and show that among ﬁrms that opt for vertical integration,
those that elect to keep their parts division close to their headquarters have higher
potential revenues than those that engage in FDI.
We close the model in Section 4 by specifying demand for the group of competing
outputs and by allowing for endogenous entry into the industry at a given cost. Principals
who pay the entry fee draw a productivity level from a known distribution of potential
productivities. In equilibrium, each entrant has expected operating proﬁts equal to the
ﬁxed entry cost. The distribution of productivities and the endogenous choice of orga-
nizational form together determine the market shares of suppliers, of foreign aﬃliates of
4multinational corporations and of integrated producers in the North.
In the succeeding sections, we study the determinants of these market shares. In
Section 5, we show how improvements in the ability to monitor distant managers result
in an increased market share for multinational corporations, and declines in the market
shares of components produced by independent suppliers and by vertically integrated
producers in the home country. Section 6 analyzes the eﬀects of falling trade costs.
There we show that trade liberalization or improvements in transportation may boost
the prevalence of outsourcing or of FDI, depending on whether the industry is one in
which most outsourcing is undertaken by ﬁrms that are highly productive or by ﬁrms
that are the least productive among those active in the industry. A concluding section
contains a summary of our results.
2 Organization of the Firm
In this section, we develop a theory of the ﬁrm based on the alternative means that a
principal has to address the problems caused by imperfect observability of a manager’s
actions. The principal owns the technology for producing a particular product. But,
to manufacture the good, she needs the cooperation of a skilled partner who can oversee
the production of an essential component. The principal can hire a partner to work
as a division manager, in which case she must provide the manager with the inputs
needed to produce the components and structure a suitable incentive contract for him.
Alternatively, she can turn to an arms-length supplier of components. Such suppliers are
led by “entrepreneurs” with skills similar to those of the managers. For now, we ignore
issues to do with the location of the potential parts division or supplier; later we shall
allow for a choice between a local manager and one who operates in a foreign subsidiary,
and between domestic and foreign outsourcing. We focus here on the decisions of a single
principal, but in Section 4 we shall embed the individual’s choice in a model of industry
5equilibrium in which ﬁrms characterized by diﬀerent productivity levels manufacture
competing products.
We assume that the principal can only operate a ﬁrm of a given (maximum) size.2 If
the principal succeeds in acquiring suitable components either from a subsidiary or an
external supplier, her output will be θ,w h e r eθ indexes the potential productivity of her
ﬁrm. If she fails to acquire components, output is zero. Output generates revenue R(θ),
with R(0) = 0 and limθ→∞R(θ)=∞. For now, we suppress the potential interactions
with other ﬁrms in the industry.
The production of components requires “eﬀort” on the part of the skilled partner – be
he a manager or an entrepreneur heading a supplier ﬁrm – in a variety of tasks. Let e(j)
be the eﬀort exerted by the manager or entrepreneur on task j. Then, with probability
R 1
0 h[e(j)]dj, the attempt to manufacture the requisite components “succeeds,” and the
resulting components can be used by the principal to produce the ﬁnal good. But with
probability 1−
R 1
0 h[e(j)]dj the project fails, and the plans to manufacture the ﬁnal good
must be aborted.3 We impose the following properties for the h(·) function:
Assumption 1 There exists a ﬁnite E>0 such that (a) 0 ≤ h(e) ≤ 1 for all e ≥ 0;
(b) h0(e) > 0 and h00(e) ≤ 0 for all e<E ;a n d( c )h0(e)=0for all e>E .
For simplicity, we assume that the principal cannot monitor at all the activities of
an entrepreneur who operates a legally distinct ﬁrm. However, if the principal hires a
division manager, it will be possible for her to observe the manager’s eﬀort on a fraction δ
of the tasks. All else equal, the ability to monitor eﬀort on some tasks gives an advantage
to in-house production relative to outsourcing. Later, we shall distinguish the fraction
2In the appendix, we show how the model can readily be extended to allow for variables scale of
production.
3This is an extreme assumption that is used to simplify the algebra. The ﬂavor of the analysis would
be preserved if the manager’s eﬀorts were to determine the productivity of the plant that manufactures
components.
6of tasks that can be monitored in a local plant from those that can be monitored in a
foreign subsidiary. Presumably, monitoring is more diﬃcult in a remote plant than in
one that is geographically proximate to the ﬁrm’s headquarters.
The production of components requires additional inputs. Some of these may be
ﬁxed costs, independent of the scale of component production. Others may be variable
costs. However, with a ﬁxed scale of operation for the ﬁnal producer, the number of
components that can be processed is given, and the ﬁxed and variable costs for the parts
manufacturer need not be distinguished.4 We denote the cost of the inputs needed to
produce the requisite quantity of components by c. These costs are paid initially by
the principal in the case of in-house production and by the entrepreneur in a supplier
relationship.
The manager or entrepreneur bears a private cost of eﬀort of e(j) on task j.T h e
total utility cost of eﬀort is
R 1
0 e(j)dj. Since marginal returns to eﬀort on a single task
are non-increasing and all tasks contribute similarly to the success of the venture, the
optimal supply contract induces an equal eﬀort from the entrepreneur on all tasks; call
it eo. Similarly, an optimal employment contract for a division manager generates the
same level of eﬀort em on all monitorable tasks, and the same level of eﬀort en on non-
monitorable tasks. All agents are risk neutral, and income and eﬀort are separable in
the entrepreneur’s or manager’s utility function. Therefore, an entrepreneur achieves
expected utility of Io −eo,w h e r eIo is the expected proﬁts net of input costs that accrue
to the supplier under an outsourcing contract. A manager enjoys an expected utility of
Im−δem−(1−δ)en,w h e r eIm is the expected income that accrues to the manager under
an employment contract. Skilled individuals have an outside option to achieve utility ¯ s
elsewhere in the economy. Thus, any outsourcing or employment contract must provide
the entrepreneur or manager with at least this level of well-being.
4In the appendix, where we allow for variable production of ﬁnal goods, we distinguish the ﬁxed costs
k from the variable costs  .
7We assume that the principal tenders a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the pool of skilled
individuals, subject to some constraints. First, if the principal hires a skilled individual
as a manager, the total compensation paid to the manager cannot be negative in any
state of nature. In other words, a manager cannot be asked to post a bond as a condition
of employment.5 Second, if the principal seeks a supplier in an outsourcing relationship,
the supply contract cannot require a net payment from the supplier to the principal in
any state of nature. Again, the entrepreneur cannot be asked to post a bond that is
forfeited in case the attempt to produce components fails. We do not try to justify these
restrictions on contracting from ﬁrst principles, but rather take them to approximate
realistic institutional and legal constraints that exist in many modern economies. At
most, the principal can design a contract that entails a zero payment to the manager or
entrepreneur in case of poor performance or an unlucky outcome; penalties or ﬁnes are
not allowed.6
With these restrictions on the feasible contracts, we see a second diﬀerence between
in-house production and outsourcing. When components are manufactured in a wholly-
owned subsidiary, the principal pays the costs of the primary inputs. Then, if the project
fails, the principal stands to lose this investment. In contrast, in an outsourcing rela-
tionship it is the entrepreneur who fronts the cost of the inputs, unless the principal
chooses to include a ﬁxed payment for this purpose in the contract oﬀer. This means
that an entrepreneur may have more at stake than a manager and it opens the possibility
that higher-powered incentives can be oﬀered under this arrangement. Also, in case the
principal ﬁnds it optimal to design a contract that leaves (expected) rents to her skilled
5See Katz (1986) for a discussion of the theoretical and practical diﬃculties that inhibit the use of
performance bonds for employees.
6We do not actually need the limit on the smallest payment in case of an unsuccessful project to be
zero; a small enough ﬁnite negative number would suﬃce to yield qualitatively similar results. Note
too that the exogenous restrictions on the negative payments would not be needed if we were to assume
that managers and entrepreneurs are risk averse.
8partner, the ability to shift input costs to a supplier but not to a manager may aﬀect the
relative attractiveness to the principal of the alternative organizational forms. When
suppliers and managers cannot be asked to post bonds, the fact that the supplier pays
the up-front cost of the inputs into parts production tends to favor outsourcing relative
to in-house production from the perspective of the principal. This cuts against the ad-
vantage of in-house production that stems from the opportunity it aﬀords the principal
to monitor some of the manager’s actions.
We proceed now to derive the (constrained) optimal contracts under each organiza-
tional form. An outsourcing contract is characterized by an amount s that the principal
promises to pay the entrepreneur whether or not the project succeeds and an amount po
that the principal will pay in case the supplier is able to provide the components that
are needed for production of the ﬁnal good. The payment of s allows for the possibility
of (endogenous) cost sharing, while our restriction constrains the contract to have s ≥ 0.
An employment contract is characterized by a level of eﬀort em that the manager is
expected to exert on all tasks that can be monitored by the principal, a wage payment w
that the manager will receive irrespective of the outcome of the project provided that he
has exerted at least the indicated level of eﬀort on the monitorable tasks, and a bonus b
that he will receive in case the project succeeds. Our restriction requires w ≥ 0.
In deriving the optimal oﬀers, we will make use of the optimal responses of an
entrepreneur or manager to the incentives that are provided in his contract. An en-
trepreneur chooses eo to maximize his expected utility, s + poh(eo) − eo.A m a n a g e r
chooses ˜ em and en to maximize w + b[δh(˜ em)+( 1− δ)h(en)] − δ˜ em − (1 − δ)en,s u b j e c t
to the constraint that the level of eﬀort on the monitorable tasks ˜ em must be at least
as great as the eﬀort em speciﬁed in the contract. The reader may verify later that the
manager has no incentive to exert “extra” eﬀort on the monitorable tasks. So we set
˜ em = em in this problem. Then note that the payment po that must be provided to an
entrepreneur to induce an eﬀort e on all tasks is the same as the bonus b that is needed
9to induce that same level of eﬀort from a manager on the monitorable tasks. We will
use the function φ(e) to denote the smallest size of the incentive needed to induce an
eﬀort level e on an unobservable task; then po = φ(eo) and b = φ(en). We can now regard
the principal as if she were choosing the eﬀorts exerted by an entrepreneur or a manager
subject to the constraint that these choices must be incentive compatible. Note that
φ(0) = 0 and φ(e)=1 /h0(e) for 0 <e<E .7
2.1 Operating Proﬁts under Outsourcing
Suppose the principal chooses to outsource the production of components. Such a
principal must choose s and eo to maximize
Πo = h(eo)R(θ) − s − h(eo)φ(eo) ,( 1 )
the diﬀerence between her expected revenues and her expected total payments to her
parts supplier. The principal’s choices are constrained by the requirements that s ≥ 0
and
s + h(eo)φ(eo) − c − eo ≥ ¯ s .( 2 )
The latter is a participation constraint, ensuring that the entrepreneur’s expected utility
(equal to his expected income less the cost of the primary inputs and the utility cost




zh(e) − e ,
which has the ﬁrst-order condition zh0(e) ≤ 1 and the complementary-slackness condition [zh0(e)−1]e =
0.D e n o t et h es o l u t i o nb ye∗(z). The solution has e∗ =0for low values of z whenever h0(0) is ﬁnite. It
is an increasing function of z whenever 0 <e ∗ <E. The reward function φ(e) is zero for e =0 ,i ti st h e
inverse of e∗(·) whenever 0 <e ∗(·) <E , and it is equal to the smallest value of z for which e∗(z)=E
for e = E. Note that φ(e) is discontinuous at e =0whenever h0 (0) is ﬁnite.
10course, the principal could always choose not to engage with any supplier or to produce
any output, in which case her operating proﬁts will be equal to zero.
Let us ignore the non-negativity constraint on s for a moment. Without this con-
straint, the principal’s operating proﬁts would be maximized by a choice of s that would
make the participation constraint (2) hold as an equality and the choice of eo that max-
imizes h(eo)R −eo.W ed e n o t et h ee ﬀort level that maximizes h(e)R −e by e∗(R). Note
that e∗(0) = 0 and that e∗(R) is a non-decreasing function for all R<R oE,w h e r eRoE
is the lowest value of R for which e∗(R)=E.8 If, when eo = e∗(R),t h ev a l u eo fs that
makes (2) hold as an equality is positive, then the principal will set eo = e∗(R) and s
equal to
s




Indeed, the non-negativity constraint does not bind for low values of R,s i n c es∗(0) =
c +¯ s>0 and s∗(·) is continuous at R =0 .9 But s∗(R) is a non-increasing function of R
for R<R oE.10 It follows that the non-negativity constraint on s may bind for a range
of higher values of R. Since the analysis is more interesting when this is so, we adopt
Assumption 2 h(E)/h0(E) − E>¯ s + c>h (0)/h0(0).
The ﬁrst inequality in Assumption 2 ensures the existence of an Rs between 0 and RoE
with the property that s∗(R) ≥ 0 for all R ≤ Rs and s∗(R) < 0 for all R>R s.
Now consider again the problem facing the principal who has chosen to deal with an
8The diﬀerence h(e)R − e may be maximized by e∗ =0for a range of small values of R.W h e n







where the derivatives in this expression are interpreted as left-hand-side derivatives.
9The function s∗(·) may be discontinuous only at the single point where R =1 /h0(0); i.e., the point
where eﬀort turns positive and the bonus may jump.
10ds∗/dR = −(hφ
0)(de∗/dR), which is zero or negative for R<R oE.
11arms-length supplier If the ﬁrm’s productivity θ is such that R(θ) ≤ Rs, the principal
chooses eo = e∗(R) and s = s∗(R). At small values of R(θ) such that the optimal contract
induces no eﬀort from the entrepreneur, Πo(R) must be negative by the second inequality
in Assumption 2.11 For larger values of R that imply above-minimum eﬀort, e∗(·) is the
inverse of the bonus function φ(·). But this means that po = φ[e∗(R)] = R and therefore
that Πo(R)=−s∗(R) ≤ 0. It follows that outsourcing cannot be proﬁtable for any
R ≤ Rs under Assumptions 1 and 2.
Accordingly, we can limit our attention to ﬁrms with productivity levels such that
R(θ) >R s.T h e s e ﬁrms set s =0 . Then the participation constraint for the entrepreneur






λ[h(eo)φ(eo) − eo − c − ¯ s]=0 ,
where λ ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier on the participation constraint. It follows that






is the largest value of revenues for which the participation constraint binds (λ>0). In
other words, in the range between Rs and Roλ,t h ee ﬀort expected of the entrepreneur
is constant at the (unique) level that leaves him with the same utility as he could attain
elsewhere. For higher levels of revenue than Roλ, it is optimal for the principal to leave
11We do not need the second inequality in Assumption 2 for any of our substantive results. Without
this assumption, there is the possibility that an outsourcing operation may be proﬁtable with no eﬀort
from the entrepreneur; this just adds another (uninteresting) case to the analysis. Note that the second
inequality in Assumption 2 will be satisﬁed if the probability of success of a venture is small when the
entrepreneur invests no eﬀort, or if the marginal productivity of the ﬁrst bit of eﬀort is large.
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Figure 1: Expected Operating Proﬁts from Outsourcing
some rents for the entrepreneur in order to induce a higher level of eﬀort than e∗(Rs). Note
that Roλ <R oE, so there always exists a range of revenues for which the participation
constraint does not bind.
Figure 1 depicts the operating proﬁts for a ﬁrm that chooses to outsource its parts
production, as a function of R (and implicitly of θ). For R<R s, these proﬁts are
negative, as we have already noted. A ﬁrm with potential revenues in this range prefers
to shut down than to contract with an outsourcing partner, considering the cost of such a
contract and the prospects for success. At R = Rs, the revenues just cover the operating
costs, i.e., Πo(Rs)=0 . Then, for a range of revenues between Rs and Roλ,e ﬀort is
constant, and operating proﬁts are a linear function of R given by
Πo (R)=Rh[e
∗ (Rs)] − φ[e
∗ (Rs)]h[e
∗ (Rs)].
For R between Roλ and RoE, the participation constraint does not bind, eﬀort increases
with R, and operating proﬁts are a convex function of R given by
13Πo (R)=m a x
e≥0
[R − φ(e)]h(e).
Finally, the ﬁrst inequality in Assumption 2 ensures that the principal will induce an
eﬀort of E for R ≥ RoE. For these highly productive ﬁrms, operating proﬁts again are a
linear function of R given by
Πo (R)=[ R − φ(E)]h(E).
2.2 Operating Proﬁts under Vertical Integration
Now suppose that the principal chooses instead to manufacture her own components by
hiring a manager to oversee a parts division. The principal must choose a contract for
the manager that speciﬁes a wage, an expected level of eﬀort on monitorable tasks, and
a bonus for success. Equivalently, we can think of the manager as choosing w, em and
en to maximize
Πv(R)=[ δh(em)+( 1− δ)h(en)][R − φ(en)] − w − c ,( 4 )
subject to
[δh(em)+( 1− δ)h(en)]φ(en)+w − δem − (1 − δ)en ≥ ¯ s.( 5 )
Here, the operating proﬁts are the expected revenues net of the expected bonus payment,
the cost of the inputs, and the wage of the manager. The constraint ensures that the
welfare of the manager is at least as great as what he could attain by working elsewhere.
The principal also is constrained to oﬀer a non-negative wage rate (w ≥ 0)a n dt oc h o o s e
non-negative levels of eﬀort for both monitorable and non-monitorable tasks.
As with outsourcing, the principal will not be constrained by the requirement that
wages be non-negative if the ﬁrm’s productivity, and thus the potential revenues, are very
low. For small values of R(θ), it is optimal for the principal to design the employment
14contract so that em = en = e∗(R) and w = w∗(R),w h e r e
w




As long as the implied wage is not negative, this contract achieves the ﬁrst-best for the
principal, with an eﬃcient level of eﬀort by the manager on all tasks and a compensation
package that leaves him with no rents.
We can deﬁne a revenue level Rw that is analogous to Rs; Rw is the largest level of
revenues at which the principal achieves the ﬁrst-best outcome. Note that Rw ≤ Rs,
because w∗(R)=s∗(R) − c and so if w∗(R) is non-negative, s∗(R) certainly is non-
negative. The principal can attain the ﬁrst-best outcome with outsourcing for a wider
range of revenue levels than with in-house production, because the outsourcing payment
compensates the manager not only for his eﬀorts and the opportunity cost of his time,
but also for the cost of the inputs that he uses to manufacture components.
It follows immediately that outsourcing is more proﬁtable than in-house production
for potential revenues near Rs. With outsourcing, the principal induces an eﬃcient level of
eﬀort at Rs and pays the entrepreneur just enough to satisfy the participation constraint.
In an integrated ﬁrm, the wage at Rs that would leave a manager who exerts the eﬃcient
level of eﬀort on all tasks indiﬀerent between working for the principal and pursuing an
outside option is negative. So the principal must either pay rents to the manager or
sacriﬁce eﬃciency on at least some tasks. Note that Πo(Rs)=0 ,s oΠv(Rs) < 0.
When potential revenues are suﬃciently greater than Rs, the principal can achieve
positive expected proﬁts with in-house production. The optimal contract is one that
maximizes (4) subject to (5) and w ≥ 0. If potential revenues are very high, the principal
will opt to have the manager exert maximal eﬀort on all tasks. In the event, the manager
will capture positive rents. For more moderate levels of revenues, the principal will tailor
the contract so as to induce em >e ∗(R) >e n, and will accept an ineﬃcient allocation of
the manager’s eﬀort across tasks. The participation constraint binds whenever em <E ,
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Figure 2: Outsourcing versus In-House Production
for otherwise the principal could demand a higher level of eﬀort on the monitorable tasks
at no cost to herself.
We are now ready to compare the expected operating proﬁts under the alternative
organizational forms. Figure 2 depicts this comparison for diﬀerent levels of revenue and
thus, implicitly, for diﬀerent productivity levels of the ﬁnal-good producer. For revenue
levels below Rs, outsourcing and in-house production both generate expected operating
losses. A principal that anticipates such a low level of potential revenues prefers to
shut down than to engage an agent as either a supplier or a manager. A more productive
principal, whose potential revenues slightly exceed Rs, can earn slightly positive expected
proﬁts by contracting with an external supplier, but would lose most of the input costs c
by employing a manager. Such a principal, and indeed any one with potential revenues
between Rs and R1, prefers outsourcing to in-house production. Outsourcing also yields
higher expected proﬁts to ﬁrms with very high levels of productivity. Consider, for
example, R ≥ RvE,w h e r eRvE is the smallest level of revenue at which it is optimal for
16the principal to induce maximal eﬀo r to na l lt a s k so ft h em a n a g e r . 12 It is easy to show
that RvE >R oE, i.e., when the principal would induce maximal eﬀort on all tasks in an
integrated ﬁrm, the optimal outsourcing contract would also induce maximal eﬀort by
the entrepreneur. With maximal eﬀort and in-house production, the expected operating
proﬁts for the principal are
Πv(R)=[ R − φ(E)]h(E) − c.
This is less than what the principal could achieve by outsourcing; the diﬀerence is simply
the cost of the inputs needed to manufacture the components. In each case, when eﬀort
is maximal, the skilled partner captures some rents. But the rents are smaller with
outsourcing than with an integrated production unit, because the input costs can be
shifted to the partner when the components are produced by a separate ﬁrm but not
when they are produced in house.
For intermediate levels of productivity, the principal may prefer vertical integration to
arms-length dealing. Figure 2 shows this to be the case, as it must be when δ is close to
one. Consider the potential operating proﬁts under the alternative organizational forms
when the ﬁrm’s productivity is such that R = RoE. Under outsourcing, the principal
induces the entrepreneur to provide eﬀort at level E, and operating proﬁts are given by
Πo(RoE)=[ RoE −φ(E)]h(E). If the principal were to hire a manager instead, she could
insist on an eﬀort level of E on the tasks that can be monitored while allowing zero
eﬀort on tasks that cannot be monitored. Such an eﬀort proﬁle would require no bonus
payment from the principal (since φ(0) = 0), but would require that the manager be
paid a wage of at least ¯ s +δE to match his outside option. By choosing a contract with
12It is optimal for the principal to induce maximal eﬀort on the tasks that cannot be monitored when
(1 − δ)[Rh0(E) − 1] − h(E)φ
0(E) ≥ 0,o rw h e n
R ≥ RvE =




17em = E, w =¯ s +δE and b =0 , the principal would achieve an expected operating proﬁt
of RoE[δE +( 1− δ)h(0)] − δE − c − ¯ s. Of course, this contract might not be optimal,
which means that Πv(RoE) is at least as large as this amount. It follows that
Πv(RoE) − Πo(RoE) ≥ h(E)φ(E) − δE − c − ¯ s − (1 − δ)[h(E) − h(0)].
But Assumption 2 ensures that the right-hand side of this inequality is positive for δ
close to one. In short, if the manager can be monitored in a large enough fraction of
tasks, then the beneﬁts of vertical integration outweigh the costs for some intermediate
range of productivity levels.
To summarize, we have shown that a principal prefers to buy components from an in-
dependent parts supplier when her productivity is suﬃciently high or rather low. Between
these extremes there may be a range of productivity levels for which vertical integration
is the preferred mode of organization. The advantage of outsourcing at high levels of
productivity comes from the opportunity it aﬀords a principal to reduce the rents that
must be granted to the agent in a situation in which it is optimal for her to tolerate some
rent sharing in order to induce maximal eﬀort. Outsourcing cuts into the agent’s rents,
because the cost of the inputs used to produce the parts can be shifted to the supplier.13
For low levels of productivity, outsourcing is advantageous for a diﬀerent reason. Here,
the eﬃcient level of eﬀort is relatively low and the agent captures no rents. But for any
level of eﬀort, the contingent payment under outsourcing that leaves the entrepreneur
without rents is larger than the bonus payment to a manager that similarly drives him to
his reservation level of utility. This is because a contingent payment po must compensate
an entrepreneur for the cost of the inputs as well as the disutility of his eﬀort, while a
13We show in the appendix that when the principal can vary her scale of operation, she leaves no
rents to the entrepreneur even when potential revenues are high. However, the comparison between
outsourcing and in-house production at diﬀerent levels of potential revenue is qualitatively the same as
what we describe in the main text.
18bonus payment b repays only the eﬀort. It follows that a principal can induce greater
eﬀort from an entrepreneur than from a manager for a given expected outlay. Put dif-
ferently, an entrepreneur who bears the cost of the inputs has more at stake in a project
than a manager who does not. When the principal brings the former to utility level ¯ s,
the resulting incentives have higher power than those that would bring a manager to the
same level of expected utility.
The possible advantage of vertical integration for an intermediate range of produc-
tivity levels stems from the opportunity it aﬀords the principal to monitor some of the
manager’s actions. On tasks that can be monitored, the principal can induce a high level
of eﬀort without having to leave rents to the manager. She can do so simply by paying
a wage that compensates the manager for his eﬀort on these tasks, and demanding that
the eﬀort be made. If enough tasks can be monitored, the principal can achieve as high a
probability of success with integration as with outsourcing without having to share rents.
3C h o i c e o f L o c a t i o n
In the ﬁrst part of this section, we develop a special case of the model in Section 2 in
which the contribution of eﬀort on a task to the probability that the project will succeed
is a piecewise linear function of the eﬀort level. By using this simple, special case we are
able to address the principal’s location problem most clearly. In the latter part of the
section, we allow for outsourcing in two regions distinguished by costs and also allow an
integrated ﬁrm to operate a local subsidiary which aﬀords relatively better opportunities










Figure 3: Piecewise Linear Productivity of Eﬀort
3.1 A Special Case: Piecewise Linearity
In this section, we take the h(·) function to be piecewise linear, with E =1and h(e)=1
for e ≥ 1.W e d e ﬁne h0, h1,a n de1 such that h(0) = h0 and h(e1)=h1,a ss h o w ni n
Figure 3. The marginal productivity of eﬀort is constant for eﬀorts between 0 and e1,
and also constant for eﬀorts between e1 and E =1 . Assumptions 1 and 2 place certain
restrictions on the parameter values, which we write as
Assumption 10 (h1 − h0)/e1 > (1 − h1)/(1 − e1)
and
Assumption 20 (h1 − e1)/(1 − h1) > ¯ s + c>e 1h0/(h1 − h0).
When the h(·) function is piecewise linear, the bonus function φ(·) is discontinuous
at both e =0and e = e1. To induce an eﬀort of e1 from the entrepreneur on any task,
or from the manager on a task that cannot be monitored, the principal must reward a




















Figure 4: Outsourcing vs. In-House Production: A Special Case
the payment must be (1 − e1)/(1 − h1).14
The potential operating proﬁts from outsourcing are depicted by the solid, kinked
curve in Figure 4. At very low levels of productivity such that R(θ) <R a =( ¯ s+c+e1)/h1,
the principal prefers to leave the market than to engage a supplier or a manager and
thereby suﬀer negative expected proﬁts. For operating proﬁts to be positive, potential
revenues must be at least as great as Ra. At this revenue level, the principal oﬀers
an incentive payment of e1/(h1 − h0), thereby inducing the entrepreneur to exert an
eﬀort of e1 on all tasks. The principal makes a ﬁxed payment to the entrepreneur of
s =¯ s + c + e1 − e1h1/(h1 − h0) to ensure that the entrepreneur is willing to accept the
contract.15 The project succeeds with probability h1 and the principal earns expected
operating proﬁts of Πo(Ra)=0 .
For a range of revenue levels above Ra, it remains optimal for the principal to write
14Recall that φ(e) is deﬁned as the smallest bonus that induces the eﬀort e.
15Note that s>0 in light of the second inequality in Assumption 20.
21a contract that induces eﬀort e1 by the entrepreneur. In this range, expected operating
proﬁts are given by Πo(R)=Rh1 − e1 − ¯ s − c. But when productivity is such that
R(θ) ≥ Rc =[ ( 1−e1)/(1−h1)2]−[(¯ s +c+e1)/(1−h1)], the principal prefers to induce
the maximal eﬀort level of E =1by oﬀering a contingent payment of (1 − e1)/(1 − h1).
Here, the non-negativity constraint for s binds. The principal sets s =0and achieves
expected operating proﬁts of Πo(R)=R − (1 − e1)/(1 − h1).
If the principal opts for in-house production of components, it is never optimal for
her to induce the manager to work harder on the tasks that cannot be monitored than on
those that are observable. We focus therefore on strategies that involve em ≥ en.T h e r e
are now several possibilities to consider. We can rule out em = en =0 ,b e c a u s ew i t h
these levels of eﬀort, expected operating proﬁts are always negative under Assumptions
10 and 20.A l s o , b y c h o o s i n g em = e1 and en =0 , the principal earns lower expected
proﬁts in an integrated operation than she does by outsourcing for all revenue levels at
which expected proﬁts under this integration strategy are positive.16 We can therefore
disregard this strategy as well.
Another possible strategy has em = en = e1. This requires a bonus oﬀer of b =
e1/(h1 − h0) and may or may not require a positive wage payment in order that the
contract satisﬁes the participation constraint. If ¯ s>e 1h0/(h1 − h0),t h e nw>0 when
em = en = e1, and the principal attains expected operating proﬁts of Rh1 − e1 − ¯ s − c.
For revenue levels between Ra and Rc, these proﬁts are exactly the same as what she
can earn by outsourcing. Recall from Section 2 that generically there exists a range of
low productivity levels at which the principal prefers outsourcing to in-house production.
Since this preference is only a weak one when ¯ s>e 1h0/(h1 − h0), we instead adopt
16With em = e1 and en =0 , the principal sets b =0and w =¯ s + δe1. Operating proﬁts are
Πv(R)=R[δh1 +( 1− δ)h0] − δe1 − ¯ s − c,w h i c hi sp o s i t i v ew h e nR>(¯ s + c + δe1)/[δh1 +( 1− δ)h0].
But for such values of R, the principal can earn proﬁts of Rh1 −e1 −¯ s−c from outsourcing by inducing
eﬀort of e = e1. Assumptions 20 ensures that these proﬁts are higher.
22Assumption 30 ¯ s<e 1h0/(h1 − h0).
Under Assumption 30, the manager of a parts division captures rents when em = en = e1,
b = e1/(h1 − h0),a n dw =0 . The associated operating proﬁts for the principal are
Rh1 − (h1e1)/(h1 − h0) − c, which is less than what she could earn by outsourcing.
In-house production also yields lower expected proﬁts than outsourcing when the
principal would set em = en =1 . To induce an eﬀort of e =1o nt a s k st h a tc a n n o tb e
monitored, the principal must oﬀer a bonus payment of b =( 1− e1)/(1 − h1).B u tt h e n
the non-negativity constraint on the wage binds, and the principal must leave rents to
the manager. The resulting proﬁts are R−[(1−e1)/(1−h1)]−c, which is less than what
the principal could earn by outsourcing and inducing an eﬀort level of e =1on all tasks.
The possible attractiveness of in-house production to the principal comes when the
optimal contract entails em =1and b = e1/(h1 − h0),s ot h a ten = e1.T h i s c a n
happen for an intermediate range of revenue levels, which is in line with our more general
ﬁndings in Section 2. When em =1and en = e1, the non-negativity constraint on the
manager’s wage may or may not bind. In either case, in-house production may yield
higher operating proﬁts to the principal than outsourcing for some values of R. However,
to avoid a taxonomy, we shall focus on the case in which the principal pays a positive
wage w>0 in order to satisfy the manager’s participation constraint. This case arises
when





− δ − (1 − δ)e1.( 6 )
Then vertical integration with em =1and en = e1 yields expected operating proﬁts to
the principal of Πv(R)=R[δ +( 1− δ)h1] − [δ +( 1− δ)e1] − ¯ s − c. These proﬁts are
depicted by the dotted line in Figure 4.17
17An alternative strategy for in-house production is for the principal to require em =1 ,p a yaw a g e
w =¯ s + δ,a n do ﬀer no bonus. Facing such a contract, the manager would make no eﬀort on tasks
that are not monitored and would be indiﬀerent between participating in the contract and not. The
alternative strategy yields expected proﬁts for the principal of R[δ +( 1− δ)h0]−δ−¯ s−c, which – for
23We see in the ﬁgure that in-house production dominates outsourcing from the princi-
pal’s perspective for R between Rb and Rd. It is easy to calculate that Rb =( 1−e1)/(1−
h1), which is to the right of Ra and independent of δ. It follows that when inequality (6)
is satisﬁed, there always exists a range of revenue levels for which the principal prefers
in-house production to outsourcing. This range is larger the greater is δ, because an
increase in δ causes the dotted line to rotate in a counterclockwise direction around point
Q.
Figure 4 reproduces the general pattern that we identiﬁed in Section 2. Firms with
productivity such that R(θ) <R a cannot achieve positive expected operating proﬁts by
either mode of organization, and so they exit the industry. Firms with potential revenues
between Ra and Rb and those with potential revenues greater than Rd prefer to outsource;
all others prefer to produce their components in house.
3.2 Choice of Location for Parts Production
At last, we are ready to address the principal’s problem about where to locate the parts
production. The are two regions, North and South, with associated variables represented
by subscripts N and S, respectively. The principal has her headquarters in the North.
If she chooses to outsource the production of components, she may choose a supplier in
the North or in the South. We assume that input costs are lower in the South (cS <c N)
and that the outside options for those with the skills needed to head a production unit
are no better there (¯ sS ≤ ¯ sN).18 The principal might also create a subsidiary to produce
all R ≥ Ra – is strictly less than the proﬁts of R[δ +( 1− δ)h1]−[δ +( 1− δ)e1]− ¯ s−c that she earns
by pursuing the strategy described in the text. However, when inequality (6) is violated, the strategy
of accepting en =0may be the best option available to the principal for some revenue levels. Then the
ﬁgure would look somewhat diﬀerent from what we have drawn in Figure 4, but the main conclusion
about the choice of organizational form for ﬁrms with diﬀerent productivity levels would remain the
same.
18Actually, our qualitative results require only that cS +¯ sS <c N +¯ sN.
24components in either the North or the South, with such a plant managed by a local
employee. We assume that the principal is able to monitor the manager’s eﬀorts in a
greater fraction of tasks when the production unit is located in the North than when it
is located in the distant South (δN >δ S).
Note that our model gives no advantage to outsourcing in the North to compensate
for the higher costs there. We might, for example, have allowed the principal to monitor
some (small) fraction of an entrepreneur’s actions, with greater opportunities for this in
the North than in the South. Then outsourcing in the North might have become viable
for some productivity levels. Or we might have allowed for diﬀerences in the “thickness”
of the markets for components or in the completeness of enforceable contracts in the
alternative legal environments. The role that these latter diﬀerences play in the location
of outsourcing activity was the focus of Grossman and Helpman (2002). Here we prefer
to keep matters simple, and so we accept that outsourcing in the North is a dominated
option in this setting.
However, foreign direct investment (FDI) and in-house production of parts in the
North both may be viable options for some parameter values and some productivity
levels. The former aﬀords an opportunity for monitoring some of the manager’s eﬀorts
without giving up the advantage of low costs. The latter provides still better opportuni-
ties for monitoring, but costs are higher. Our next task is to compare the three options
of outsourcing (in the South), home production and FDI for diﬀerent levels of produc-
tivity. We can readily show that vertical integration in location j can only compete with
outsourcing when the principal would choose emj =1for the manager’s eﬀort on tasks
that can be monitored in location j and enj = e1 for tasks that cannot be monitored. So
we limit our attention to these strategies.
F i r s tn o t et h a tf o rl o wl e v e l so fR at which foreign outsourcing is only marginally
proﬁtable, outsourcing is the preferred mode of organization for the principal. The com-




Rv Ra Rb Rk
) 1 )( /( ) (







h c s c s R R
h e R
h e c s R
S N S S N N b v
b
S S a










Figure 5: Expected Proﬁts for Piecewise Linear Productivity of Eﬀort
the former dominates at low levels of productivity and revenues, because the principal can
structure higher-powered incentives for an entrepreneur who must front the cost of inputs
than she can for a manager who must be paid a non-negative wage no matter what the
outcome of the project. The principal in turn prefers FDI to home in-house production
when inequality (6) is satisﬁed for (at least) all revenue levels R ≤ Rb =( 1−e1)/(1−h1).
To see this point, recall that an increase in δ rotates the line representing proﬁts under
vertical integration around the point Q in Figure 4. This means that the fraction of moni-
torable tasks has no bearing on operating proﬁts under vertical integration when R = Rb.
But the lower costs in the South give FDI a clear advantage over in-house production in
the North at R = Rb;i nf a c t ,ΠvS(Rb) − ΠvN(Rb)=( ¯ sN + cN) − (¯ sS + cS) > 0.
Figure 5 shows the maximal expected operating proﬁts for a ﬁrm with potential
revenues R. Implicitly, this ﬁgure reveals the optimal choice of organization and location
for each value of R.F o rR<R a =( ¯ sS + cS + e1)/h1, expected operating proﬁts must
26be negative for each of the three organizational forms, and so exit is the best available
strategy. For R = Ra, outsourcing in the South achieves zero expected proﬁts. Next
comes a range of revenue levels between Ra and Rb for which outsourcing is proﬁtable
and the best of the three alternatives. As we just described, outsourcing oﬀers low costs
to the principal and aﬀords the opportunity for her to structure high-powered incentives
for the entrepreneur without sharing rents. When R = Rb, the expected proﬁts for FDI
match those for outsourcing and exceed those available to a ﬁrm that produces its own
components in the North. In the range between Rb and Rv, the principal chooses FDI
over outsourcing, because she values the ability to monitor the manager on a fraction δS
of the tasks. But in this range, the beneﬁt of lower costs still outweighs the cost of less
monitoring in the comparison between FDI and in-house production at home.
The ﬁgure shows Rv = Rb+[(¯ sN+cN)−(¯ sS+cS)]/[(δN−δS)(1−h1)] to be the revenue
level at which FDI and in-house production in the North yield equal expected proﬁts.
At R = Rv, the cost savings that favor FDI are matched by the beneﬁts from closer
monitoring of the manager’s eﬀorts. Since potential revenues are reasonably high in the
range above Rv, the principal places great importance on achieving a high probability
that the project will succeed. She is willing to pay more for inputs and to compensate
the manager more handsomely in order to mitigate the damage caused by the manager’s
moral hazard.
Finally, highly productive principals prefer foreign outsourcing to in-house production
in the North and to FDI. Speciﬁcally, when θ is such that R(θ) >R k,w h e r e
Rk =
1−e1
1−h1 − [δN +( 1− δN)e1 − (¯ sN + cN)]
1 − [δN +( 1− δN)h1]
,
the principal achieves higher expected operating proﬁts by outsourcing than by opening a
local subsidiary.19 The reason is that when very large revenues are at stake the principal
19There is no guarantee that Rk >R v for all parameter values. If δN is not very much larger than δS
or if cN +¯ sN is very much greater than cS +¯ sS, then there will be no values of R for which the principal
27will do whatever is necessary to ensure maximal eﬀort by the entrepreneur or manager
and a high probability of success. To induce an eﬀort of e =1on all tasks, the principal
must share rents with the entrepreneur or manager. But the principal foregoes fewer
rents with outsourcing than with (any form of) in-house production, because the input
bill that is initially paid by the entrepreneur serves as a tax on his take of rents.
To summarize, we have shown that the ﬁr m si na ni n d u s t r yh a v ed i ﬀerent incentives
to open foreign subsidiaries and to engage in foreign outsourcing depending on their
productivity levels. Our model suggests that the least and most productive ﬁrms will
turn to external suppliers for the component needs, while the ﬁrms that operate foreign
subsidiaries will be less productive than those that manufacture their own components
in a plant nearer to their headquarters.
4 Industry Equilibrium
In this section, we embody our model of a ﬁrm’s choice of organizational mode and
location in a setting of industry equilibrium. We assume that principals can enter the
industry by bearing a ﬁxed entry cost of f. Those that pay this cost draw a productivity
level from a known distribution G(θ), just as in Melitz (2002) and Helpman, Melitz and
Yeaple (2002). The ﬁrms then choose their organizational form (including location) and
design an optimal purchase or employment contract in the light of their decision. Firms
that are successful in acquiring components manufacture diﬀerentiated products that
compete for consumers’ spending.
We assume a world populated by many consumers, each with the utility function
u = y0 + yη/η,w h e r ey0 is consumption of a homogenous good and y is an index of
consumption of the varieties of the diﬀerentiated product.20 The elasticity of demand for
prefers in-house production in the North to both FDI and foreign outsourcing.
20This measure of utility does not include the sebarable component of utility loss associated with
28the group of diﬀerentiated products (with respect to an ideal price index) is 1/(1 − η),







, 0 <α<1 ,
where y (j) is consumption of variety j.W i t ht h i ss p e c i ﬁcation, 1/(1 − α) is the elasticity
of demand for variety j and a higher value of α implies greater substitution across varieties
and a higher demand elasticity for each brand. We assume α>η , so that the varieties
substitute more closely for one another than does the group of diﬀerentiated products
substitute for the numeraire good.21
We normalize the measure of consumers to equal one. Then the aggregate world




where p(j) is the price of brand j.Aﬁrm’s revenue from selling brand j is yη−αy (j)
α.
If a ﬁrm with productivity θ is successful in obtaining components, it can produce θ




Clearly, a ﬁrm’s potential revenue is the product of two components; a component that
depends on aggregate industry characteristics, summarized by y, and an idiosyncratic
component, θ. The cumulative distribution function of θ, G(θ), induces a cumulative
distribution on R.
the eﬀort that an individual exerts on her job. Note that we could accomodate many industries with




l /ηl; then our analysis here would apply to any
industry l.
21The discussion in this section does not require speciﬁc functional forms for the utility function. We
use these forms for convenience only. An exponential function y (j)
α is, however, needed in the next
section to derive closed-form solutions for the market shares.
29Equation (7) can be used to map each revenue cutoﬀ level in Figure 5 into a produc-
tivity cutoﬀ level. For example, since Rv is the revenue level at which a principal is just
indiﬀerent between in-house production in the North and FDI, θv = R
1/α
v y(α−η)/α is the
productivity level that generates such indiﬀerence. And similarly for the revenue levels
Ra, Rb,a n dRk, and the corresponding productivity levels θa, θb,a n dθk.S i n c eα>η ,a l l
of these productivity cutoﬀ levels are increasing in the index of industry consumption.
We can now calculate the expected operating proﬁts facing a principal prior to entry,
i.e., before she learns her productivity level. Let Πij(R) denote the operating proﬁts for
a ﬁrm with revenue R that operates with mode of organization i (i = o or v)a n dl o c a t e s
parts production in country j (j = S or N). If a principal draws a productivity level
below θa = R
1/α
a y(α−η)/α, she will forego the opportunity to engage a supplier or hire a
manager and earn zero operating proﬁts. If her productivity level falls between θa and
θb, she will choose to buy components from a supplier in the South (as we know from
our earlier discussion) and earn operating proﬁts of ΠoS (yη−αθ
α). If productivity falls
between θb and θv, FDI will be the chosen mode of organization, with expected proﬁts
of ΠvS (yη−αθ
α). In-house production in the North is indicated for productivity levels
between θv and θk, with resulting expected proﬁts of ΠvS (yη−αθ
α). Finally, for high
levels of productivity above θk, the principal opts for outsourcing in the South and earns
expected proﬁts of ΠoS (yη−αθ
α). In equilibrium, the expected operating proﬁts for a















































dG(θ)=f .( 8 )
Expected operating proﬁts for a potential entrant are a strictly decreasing function of y,
which means that there is a unique index of industry consumption that delivers expected
proﬁts equal to the entry cost.
30We are interested in how falling trade costs (and other changes in the production
environment) aﬀect the relative prevalence of the diﬀerent modes of organization. For
this, we need to deﬁne measures of relative prevalence. We could measure this in terms
of the numbers of components produced by diﬀerent sorts of entities, by the output of
ﬁnal goods that embody components produced in diﬀerent entities, or by the revenues
collected by ﬁrms of the diﬀerent types. Fortunately, all of these measures yield similar
answers to the questions of interest, so we can focus on just one. We shall measure
relative prevalence in the industry by the shares of components that are manufactured
by arms-length suppliers, by foreign subsidiaries, and by in-house parts divisions located
in the North.
We let X denote the total output of components manufactured by producers of all
types and let n denote the number of principals that enter the industry. A fraction
G(θb) − G(θa) of the entrants draw productivity levels between θa and θb,w h i c hm e a n s
that they engage in outsourcing. Of these, a fraction h1 is successful in acquiring
components, because principals with productivity levels in the indicated range induce
their outsourcing partners to exert eﬀort of e1. It follows by the law of large numbers that
n[G(θb) − G(θa)]h1 units of components are produced by the supplier ﬁrms of principals
with productivities in this range. Southern subsidiaries of multinational corporations
produce a total of n[G(θv)−G(θb)][δS+(1−δS)h1] units of components, because a fraction
G(θv)−G(θb) of principals draw productivity levels that make hiring a Southern manager
the optimal strategy, and these managers are induced to exert maximal eﬀort on tasks
that can be monitored and intermediate eﬀort of e1 o nt a s k st h a ta r en o to b s e r v a b l e .B y
similar reasoning, n[G(θk)−G(θv)][δN +(1−δN)h1] is the number of units of components
produced in-house by ﬁrms with a parts division located in the North. Finally, a fraction
1−G(θk) of entrants draw productivity levels above θk.T h e s eﬁrms engage in outsourcing
and all succeed in acquiring the needed components by inducing their partners to exert
maximal eﬀort. The resulting number of components is n[1 − G(θk)]. The total output
31of components is the sum of these numbers, or
X = n[G(θb) − G(θa)]h1 + n[G(θv) − G(θb)][δS +( 1− δS)h1]
+n[G(θk) − G(θv)][δN +( 1− δN)h1]+n[1 − G(θk)].( 9 )
We can now readily compute the shares of components produced under the diﬀerent
modes of organization. Let σo represent the share of components produced by outsourcing
partners, σvS represent the share produced by ﬁrms that engage in FDI, and σvN represent













{[G(θk) − G(θv)][δN +( 1− δN)h1]}. (12)
Notice that the market shares do not depend on the number of principals that enter,
because n/X is independent of n.22
5 Improved Monitoring in the South
In this section, we show how the model can be used to investigate the eﬀects of changes in
the production environment on the relative prevalence of diﬀerent modes of organization.
We consider an increase in δS, which is the fraction of tasks undertaken by a division
manager in the South that can be monitored by the principal in the North. Such a gain
22The equilibrium number of entrants n c a nb es o l v e du s i n gt h ed e ﬁnition of y, the equilibrium output
of diﬀerentiated products of the various types, and the free-entry condition (8), which determines a
unique equilibrium level of y.
32in monitoring possibilities may result from improvements in communications technology
or perhaps from changes in the legal system.
In order to derive speciﬁc results, we need to make additional assumptions about the
distribution of productivity levels among potential entrants. There is evidence to suggest
that this distribution is well approximated by a Pareto distribution, so rather than derive
suﬃcient conditions for G(·) under which certain results may hold, we choose to work
with this simple functional form.23 We henceforth assume that G(θ)=1− θ
−β,f o r
θ ≥ 1 and β>1. With this distribution, the minimum productivity level for a potential
entrant is one and there is no limit on the maximum productivity level.
As we have noted previously, an increase in δS rotates the dotted line in Figure 4 in
a counterclockwise direction around point Q. It therefore has no eﬀect on Rb,t h el e v e l
of potential revenue at which outsourcing and FDI yield the same expected proﬁts. It
does, however, cause Rv to rise, which means that the principal prefers FDI to in-house
production in the North for a wider range of potential revenues. As δS increases, there is
no change in Ra or Rk, as the ability to monitor managers in the South has no bearing on
the proﬁtability of outsourcing in the South or on the relative proﬁtability of outsourcing
versus in-house production in the North.
For given y, an improvement in a principal’s ability to monitor managers in the South
must increase the expected operating proﬁts of potential entrants, the term on the left-
hand side of (8). This means that additional principals will enter the industry (n rises),
causing y to grow as well. However, the induced growth in the number of entrants and
the consumption index have no direct eﬀect on the market shares.
The growth in y will also cause an upward shift in all of the cutoﬀ productivity levels,
23See, for example, Axtell (2001), who provides evidence that the Pareto distribution ﬁts well the
distribution of sales by ﬁrm in the United States. Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2002) have shown how
a Pareto distribution of ﬁrm sizes will emerge from a Pareto distribution of productivity levels. They
also verify that Axtell’s aggregate results hold for all but a handful of the 52 industries in their data set.
33i.e., in θa, θb, θv,a n dθk. This is because, with greater industry competition as measured
by the index of industry output, a given ﬁrm must have higher productivity itself to
achieve the same level of revenues as before. However, all of the cutoﬀ productivity
levels appear similarly in the numerators and denominators of the expressions for market
share; each such term is raised to the power of −β. It follows that the aggregate output
of a component type (the numerators in the market share expressions) and the aggregate
output of all components (the denominators in the market share expressions) grow by
t h es a m ep r o p o r t i o na sy increases and thus the aggregate consumption index has no
indirect eﬀe c to nt h em a r k e ts h a r e sa sw e l l .
We are left with two eﬀects of an increase in the fraction of tasks that can be monitored
in the South. An increase in δS generates an increase in the probability that any given
parts division in the South will be successful in producing components, because managers
of Southern subsidiaries devote more eﬀort to tasks that are monitored than to those that
are not. And an increase in δS causes a wider range of principals to locate their parts
divisions in the South, as Rv rises. The former eﬀect tends to increase X/n, the average
number of components produced per entrant, while the latter eﬀect tends to reduce it
(since parts divisions in the South succeed less often than those in the North). On net,
however, the former eﬀect dominates with a Pareto distribution of productivity levels,
and so the average output of components per entrant rises.24
Now we are ready to discuss the shifts in the market shares. Consider ﬁrst the
market share of components produced by arms-length suppliers, σo.T h e r ei sn oe ﬀect of
a change in δS on the cutoﬀ productivity levels at which principals choose to outsource
their components beyond what results from the change in y, which we know does not
24To justify this claim, we totally diﬀerentiate I/
£
nyβ(η−α)/α¤
with respect to δS, taking account of
the fact that Rv = Rb+(¯ sN + cN − ¯ sS − cS)/(δN − δS)(1− h1). The sign of this derivative is the same
as the sign of q−β/α−1−(1 − q)β/α, where q = Rb/Rv < 1.S i n c eq−β/α is convex in q, this derivative
must be positive.
34aﬀect the market shares. So the term in curly brackets in (10) does not change for given
y. But we have just noted that X/n rises for given y, due to the dominant eﬀect of the
improved productivity of Southern parts divisions. It follows that the relative prevalence
of outsourcing falls.
The fraction of components emanating from integrated ﬁrms with a parts division in
the North falls by an even greater percentage than σo. From (12) we see that σvN falls,
because the term in curly brackets falls for given y as Rv rises and also because X/n
grows. The growing productivity of subsidiaries in the South means that a subsidiary
with given productivity will generate a higher average output of components and it also
spells a shift away from in-house production in the North in favor of FDI. For both
reasons, the market share of Northern parts divisions falls.
Finally, the three market shares sum to one. Since σo and σvN both fall, it must be
that σvS rises, i.e., the output of components by Southern subsidiaries grows by more than
the aggregate output of components. Thus, an increased ability to monitor managers in
the South makes in-house production in the South a more attractive option relative to
both of the alternative modes of organization.
Our results in this section are broadly consistent with some recent empirical evidence
on the determinants of the form of foreign investment and the extent of vertical special-
ization in multinational ﬁrms. For example, Lin and Png (2002) examine the form of
FDI undertaken by 148 Taiwanese ﬁrms that made investments in China between 1987
and 1991. They consider the ﬁrms’ decision whether to structure the FDI as a joint
venture or as a wholly-owned subsidiary, taking distance from Hong Kong as a proxy for
the principal’s ability to monitor the local agent. A joint venture is more like outsourc-
ing in our model, inasmuch as the local entrepreneur has a greater stake in the project
than does the local manager of a wholly-owned subsidiary. Lin and Png ﬁnd that joint
ventures are more likely to be chosen as distance from Hong Kong increases, which is in
keeping with our ﬁnding that the range of (low-productivity) ﬁrms that choose outsourc-
35ing over FDI expands as δS declines. In related work, Hanson et al. (2002) examine the
determinants of the extent of foreign aﬃliate processing of inputs imported from a par-
ent U.S. ﬁrm. After controlling for trade barriers and transportation costs between the
parent and subsidiary, they ﬁnd that the extent of such vertical specialization is decreas-
ing in the distance between parent and subsidiary, is greater for subsidiaries located in
English speaking countries than those that are not, and is higher in Mexico and Canada
then would be predicted based on distance (and the other variables) alone. All of these
ﬁndings can be viewed as consistent with our prediction that an increase in δS (proxied
by distance, common language, and adjacency) raises the relative proﬁtability of FDI
compared to other modes of organization.25
6 Falling Trade Costs
In this section, we study how falling trade costs aﬀect the international organization of
production. Both trade liberalization and declining transportation costs have contributed
in recent years to the globalization of economic activity. We are interested in whether
and under what circumstances a decline in trade costs will favor one mode of organization
over another.
To examine this issue, we ﬁrst must extend our model to include trade costs. We
assume that transporting a component from South to North entails a per unit cost of τ.
This cost may reﬂect a shipping charge, or it may result from an import tariﬀ imposed
by the government of the North. The same cost applies whether the component is traded
within the ﬁrm (as when the part is produced in a foreign subsidiary) or at arms-length
25Hanson et al. (2002) also ﬁnd that the cost share of intermediate inputs imported by a foreign
aﬃliate from its U.S. parent for further processing is decreasing in the wage of unskilled labor in the
host country. This too is consistent with the comparative static properties of our model, i.e., that the
market share of FDI falls with cS.
36(as when a ﬁrm arranges for delivery of parts from a Southern supplier). In case of
foreign outsourcing, the contract term po now refers to the amount that is paid to the
foreign entrepreneur in the event that he delivers suitable components to the principal’s
assembly plant in the North.26
The presence of trade costs modiﬁes the relationship between expected operating
proﬁts and potential revenues. Consider ﬁrst a principal with low productivity for whom
foreign outsourcing will be the preferred mode of organization if she chooses to operate
at all.27 Such a principal designs a contract under which the expected utility of the
foreign entrepreneur is just equal to ¯ sS, the utility he could achieve by pursuing his
outside option. This means that the incidence of the trade costs falls on the principal.
Since we have normalized the number of components she can process to equal one, τ is
the total trade cost she will bear in the event that the foreign entrepreneur is able to
deliver the components. Thus, expected operating proﬁts from outsourcing are ΠoS(R)=
(R − τ)h1 − e1 − (¯ sS + cS) for R ≤ Rb. The minimum potential revenues necessary for
such a principal to enter into any contract with a supplier are Ra = τ +(e1+¯ sS +cS)/h1.
At Rb, the principal is indiﬀerent between outsourcing and engaging a manager to
head a subsidiary in the South. In the event of FDI, the principal bears any trade costs
that arise. Expected operating proﬁts in this mode of organization and with the optimal
employment contract for the manager are ΠvS(R)=( R − τ)[δS +( 1− δS)h1] − [δS +
(1−δS)]e1 −(¯ sS +cS),f o rR between Rb and Rv.F r o mΠoS(Rb)=ΠvS(Rb) we ﬁnd that
Rb = τ +( 1− e1)/(1 − h1) i nt h ep r e s e n c eo ft r a d ec o s t s .
Costs that arise from importing components do not aﬀect the potential proﬁtability
of in-house production in the North for a given R.T h u sΠvN(R)=R[δN +(1−δN)h1]−
26Alternatively, the principal might choose to make the account payable upon delivery of components
in the foreign country. It can be shown, however, that at al productivity levels, a principal prefers (at
least weakly) to set a c.i.f. price rather than a f.o.b. price.
27We assume that the trade costs are not so large as to make domestic outsourcing a more attractive
option than foreign outsourcing.
37[δN +( 1− δN)]e1 − (¯ sN + cN) for R between Rv and Rk, as before. We calculate the
new value of potential revenues that makes the principal indiﬀerent between in-house





(¯ sN + cN) − (¯ sS + cS) − τ[δS +( 1− δS)h1]
(δN − δS)(1 − h1)
.
Finally, when potential revenues are suﬃciently great, a principal will ﬁnd it optimal
to outsource the production of components. Moreover, she will opt to provide suﬃcient
incentives for the foreign entrepreneur to exert maximal eﬀort, thereby creating rents
for the entrepreneur. The trade costs, like the cost of the inputs used to produce the
components, are borne initially by the foreign entrepreneur, since the contingent payment
po is made only when the goods are delivered to the principal in the North. When the
entrepreneur capture rents, the incidence of the trade costs falls on him. This means
that the principal achieves the same proﬁts from outsourcing as when trade costs are
zero; namely ΠoS(R)=R − (1 − e1)/(1 − h1) when R ≥ Rk. The potential revenues Rk
at which in-house production in the North and foreign outsourcing yield equal expected
proﬁts also is the same as before.
We consider now the eﬀects of a fall in trade costs τ. In Figure 6, the dotted line
indicates that when τ declines, operating proﬁts rise for ﬁrms that outsource in the
South and for those that undertake FDI. The point at which principals elect to engage a
supplier rather than exit the market shifts from Ra to R0
a, because principals are able to
make positive operating proﬁts for a wider range of revenue levels when trade costs are
lower. The level of potential revenues at which principals are indiﬀerent between FDI and
outsourcing also falls (from Rb to R0
b). This reﬂects the fact that a fall in trade costs boosts
ΠvS (·) by more than it does ΠoS (·) at a given level of potential revenues, inasmuch as
a multinational achieves a higher probability of successfully producing components than










Figure 6: Fall in Trade Costs
than the latter.28 The fall in trade costs makes the South a relatively more attractive
location for in-house production of components, so Rv rises. Note again that Rk is
unaﬀected.
It follows readily from this discussion that the market share of components produced
28The probability of success for a multinational ﬁrm operating in the South is δS +(1−δS)h1,w h i c h
exceeds h1, the probability of success for an independent supplier.
39by vertically integrated ﬁr m si nt h eN o r t hf a l l s . 29 It is hardly surprising that a reduction
in trade costs increases the market share of imported components. But it remains to
be seen whether this reﬂects an expansion in the share of components purchased from
supplier ﬁrms, the share produced by foreign subsidiaries of multinational corporations,
or both. We will now show that the answer to this question depends sensitively on the
characteristics of the ﬁrms that engage in outsourcing, and in particular on whether these
are predominantly low-productivity ﬁrms that outsource so as to generate higher-powered
incentives for their partners or predominantly high-productivity ﬁrms that outsource to
conserve on the rents that they pay to their partners.
To make this point, we consider two extreme cases. Suppose ﬁrst that h1 =( e1+¯ sS+
cS)/(1 + ¯ sS + cS),s ot h a tRa = Rb. Then, there are no ﬁrms with low productivity that
outsource the production of components; all outsourcing takes place among the ﬁrms
with the very highest levels of productivity.30 The fall in import costs confers no direct
beneﬁtt ot h e s eﬁrms, because such trade costs are borne in any case by the foreign
entrepreneurs. It follows that there is no direct spur to outsourcing in this case, and thus
no change in the term in curly brackets in (10). But X/nyβ(η−α)/α grows as τ shrinks,
29Using (9), (12), G(θ)=1−θ
−β and θi = R
1/α
i y(α−η)/α for i = a,b,v, and k,w ec a nw r i t et h em a r k e t


































[δN +( 1− δN)h1]+R
−β/α
k .
Then, the fact that dRa/dτ = dRb/dτ > 0, dRv/dτ < 0,a n ddRk/dτ =0implies dσvN/dτ > 0.
30The relative weight of low productivity ﬁrms also declines when the distribution G(θ) shifts to the
right. For example, the Pareto distribution can be extended to 1 − (γ/θ)
β,w h e r eγ>0.I n t h i s c a s e
the support is θ ≥ γ.A nu p w a r ds h i f ti nγ shifts the distribution to the right.
40because in-house production of components in the South expands by more than in-house
production in the North contracts.31 Therefore, the relative prevalence of outsourcing
falls. Even the absolute volume of outsourcing might fall under these circumstances,
because the ﬁrms that outsource garner no beneﬁt from the fall in trade costs but face
greater competition from multinationals and from new entrants to the industry.
In this case where σvN and σo both decline, the market share of components produced
by foreign subsidiaries of multinational corporations must rise. These ﬁrms beneﬁtd i -
rectly from the fall in trade costs, which expands the range of potential revenue levels
for which FDI takes place at both the upper and lower ends. The rise in output (given
n and y) outpaces the rise in total output of components, because output by integrated
ﬁrms in the North contracts.
Now suppose that δS does not diﬀer much from δN and that both are very close to one.
We also assume for the purposes of this example that ¯ sN+cN > ¯ sS+cS+τ[δS+(1−δS)h1].
In this case, both Rv and Rk are very large, which means that virtually all outsourcing
takes place among ﬁrms with relatively low levels of productivity. Moreover, in this
situation, virtually all components are produced in the South.32
A little algebra suﬃces to show that as trade costs fall under these diﬀerent conditions,
the relative prevalence of outsourcing must increase.33 But since ﬁrms that outsource and
t h o s et h a te n g a g ei nF D Is h a r ev i r t u a l l yt h ee n t i r em a r k e tw h e nRv and Rk are large, the
fraction of components produced by multinationals must fall. As we have noted, a fall
in trade costs causes Rb to fall, which means that the volume of components produced
b yf o r e i g ns u b s i d i a r i e sr i s e s .B u tt h eg r o w t hi nF D Ii sm o r et h a nm a t c h e di np e r c e n t a g e







b ) < 0.
32Now the weight of the high productivity ﬁrms falls when the distribution G(θ) shifts to the left.
With G(θ)=1− θ
−β, this happens when β rises. A higher β reduces the weight on the tail of the
distribution.











a (1−Rb/Ra), which is negative, because Rb >R a.
41terms by the growth in outsourcing (associated with the decline in Ra), which occurs
because some principals with low productivity now ﬁnd it proﬁtable to engage a supplier
rather than to exit the industry. And the number of low productivity principals is larger
than the number of high productivity principals when G(θ) is a Pareto distribution.
We conclude that the eﬀects of falling trade costs on the mode of organization and the
nature of international trade will vary across industries. Trade liberalization tends to fa-
vor multinational activity in industries in which outsourcing is conducted predominantly
by high productivity ﬁrms that are seeking to minimize the rents they must share with
the head of a parts division in order to induce high levels of eﬀort. In contrast, trade lib-
eralization spurs arms-length trade with suppliers when most outsourcing is undertaken
by relatively low productivity ﬁrms that are seeking to boost the power of the incentives
they can provide to their component producers. In the former case, the fall in trade
costs does little to increase the proﬁtability of outsourcing, but ﬁrms that engage in FDI
realize an immediate cost savings. In the latter case, the principal beneﬁts under either
mode of organization involving trade, but outsourcing receives a greater boost because
it can expand at the extensive margin.
7 Conclusions
We have developed a model in which the heterogeneous ﬁrms in an industry choose their
modes of organization and the location of their subsidiaries or suppliers. We assume
that the principals of a ﬁrm are institutionally or legally constrained in the nature of the
contracts they can write with suppliers and employees. In particularly, a supplier cannot
be asked to post a (large) bond that will be forfeited in the event that the ﬁrm’s eﬀorts to
produce suitable components prove unsuccessful. Similarly, a manager cannot be asked
to pay a ﬁne if his division performs poorly, nor can he be asked to pay personally for the
inputs used by his division. In such an institutional setting, the contracts that principals
42can write with their suppliers and division managers may not induce eﬃcient levels of
eﬀort on all relevant tasks.
We identiﬁed two reasons why a principal may beneﬁt from engaging an external
supplier to manufacture components in a setting like this. First, the principal can confront
an agent with higher-powered incentives when the agent has more at stake. A supplier
can be made to front the cost of the inputs needed to manufacture components and so
can be given a greater stake in the project than a manager. Second, when a principal
ﬁnds it desirable to induce a very high level of eﬀort from her agent, the cost to the
principal of providing the necessary incentives is less for an outside supplier than for an
employee. Again, the input costs play a key role in this. In the main text, we showed
that principals who are capacity constrained must leave rents to their agents when they
induce the highest level of eﬀort. But the rents are smaller for an entrepreneur than
for a manager, because the principal can pass along input costs to the former but not
the latter. In the appendix, we relaxed the assumption of a ﬁxed ﬁrm size and found a
similar mechanism at work. With variable scale, the rents that might potentially go to
an entrepreneur can be fully taxed away by a principal in a supplier relationship. The
principal who wants high eﬀort oﬀers a large bonus, but also demands a large delivery of
components, thereby minimizing the net cost of the incentive contract.
Against the beneﬁts of outsourcing, there is an advantage to in-house production that
stems from the greater opportunity it aﬀords the principal to monitor the actions of her
agent. We assume that the ability to monitor an agent declines with distance; a vertically
integrated ﬁrm is able to observe a division manager’s actions on more tasks when the
division is located near the headquarters than when it is located in a diﬀerent country.
Thus, FDI suﬀers the disadvantage of lesser monitoring compared to in-house production
near the headquarters, but the possible advantage of lower costs.
Our main result concerns the sorting of ﬁrms in an industry into diﬀerent organiza-
tional forms. The least productive ﬁrms that are active in equilibrium choose to subcon-
43tract the production of components to suppliers in the South. For these ﬁrms, the ability
to oﬀer higher-powered incentives with outsourcing weighs most heavily. Firms with in-
termediate levels of productivity opt for vertical integration, with the less productive of
these undertaking foreign investment in the South and the more productive operating a
parts division in the North. FDI does not appeal as much to the more productive ﬁrms,
because the ability to monitor a manager’s eﬀorts becomes more valuable as potential
revenues rise. Finally, outsourcing is the preferred option for the most productive ﬁrms
in an industry, because the principals of these ﬁrms who want to induce a high level of
eﬀort are able to pass along input costs to a supplier but not to a manager.
We used our model to examine the implications of falling trade costs for the relative
prevalence of the diﬀerent organizational modes. An important observation is that trade
liberalization may promote mostly FDI or mostly outsourcing, depending on the char-
acteristics of an industry. In particular, the market share of imports from suppliers will
expand as trade costs fall if most of the outsourcing is undertaken by low productivity
ﬁrms in which the principals are motivated by a desire to give their agents a greater
stake in the venture. But the market share of imports from suppliers will contract as
trade costs fall if most outsourcing is undertaken by high productivity ﬁrms in which the
principals are motivated by a desire to minimize the rents captured by their agents. The
equilibrium sorting of ﬁrms by productivity level plays an important part in delivering
these conclusions.
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468 Appendix: Variable Scale of Production
In the main text, we assumed that the principal can only operate a ﬁrm of a given size.
In this appendix, we allow the principal to choose her scale of production. We take the
output of components in a successful venture to be proportional to the inputs of labor
and materials, and normalize the unit variable cost of a component to equal one. The
production of components may also entail a ﬁxed cost, which we denote by k.
Once again, principals are distinguished by their potential productivity. A principal
with productivity θ can produce θ  units of output from   components and collect rev-
enues of R(θ ). A principal who attempts to produce components in house will choose  v
directly, and will bear the ﬁxed and variable costs of this operation. The probability that
such a venture succeeds depends on the eﬀorts of a manager in a continuum of tasks. If
the principal chooses instead to contract with an independent supplier, she will specify
t h es i z eo fh e ro r d e r , o. We assume that she can verify whether the entrepreneur pur-
chases the inputs that are needed to make the production of  o units of the component
possible. But the principal cannot observe the eﬀorts exerted by the entrepreneur on any
of the tasks that determine the probability that usable components will result from the
project.
As in Section 2, we neglect the locational component of the principal’s decision to focus
instead on the choice of organizational mode. Consider ﬁrst a principal with productivity
θ who opts to outsource the production of components. Such a principal chooses a (non-
negative) guaranteed payment s, an order size  o, and a payment for delivery po to
maximize expected proﬁts. Recognizing again that the principal can induce eﬀort eo
with a payment po = φ(eo), the principal’s problem is to maximize
Πo = h(eo)R(θ o) − s − h(eo)φ(eo) (A1)
subject to s ≥ 0 and
s + h(eo)φ(eo) −  o − k − eo ≥ ¯ s.( A 2 )
47We assume (in place of Assumption 2) that h(E)/h0(E)−E>¯ s+k; i.e., if the principal
elects to induce the highest level of eﬀort E with the incentive payment φ(E)=1 /h0(E),
the entrepreneur would be willing to purchase some positive quantity of the inputs that
are necessary for the production of components.
Observe ﬁrst that the participation constraint (A2) always binds in this problem.
Were it not to bind, the principal could expand her order of components (i.e., increase  o)
and raise expected proﬁts at no cost to herself. Note too that if the constraint s ≥ 0 does
not bind, the principal can choose the eﬀort level eo and the order size  o that maximizes
joint welfare for herself and the entrepreneur. But since the entrepreneur would achieve
only his reservation level of utility ¯ s, this outcome would be ﬁrst-best for the principal.
We denote by e∗ = ςe(θ) the entrepreneur’s eﬀort level in the principal’s ﬁrst-best, and
by  ∗ = ς (θ) the corresponding order size . For an exponential revenue function with
exponent between zero and one – such as arises for the CES utility function described
in Section 4 – both e∗ and  ∗ are increasing functions of θ as long as e∗ <E .M o r e o v e r ,
there exists a ﬁnite productivity level θE such that ςe(θ) <Eand ς (θ) <  E ≡ ς (θE)
for all θ<θ E and ςe(θ)=E and ς (θ)= E for all θ ≥ θE.
Next consider a principal with productivity θ who chooses to manufacture components
in house. Such a principal will choose a wage w,a ne ﬀort level em on observable tasks,
an eﬀort level en (and associated bonus payment) on non-observable tasks, and a scale
of operation  v to maximize
Πv =[ δh(em)+( 1− δ)h(en)][R(θ v) − φ(en)] − w −  v − k
subject to w ≥ 0 and
w +[ δh(em)+( 1− δ)h(en)]φ(en) − δem − (1 − δ)en ≥ ¯ s.
We compare now the maximum expected proﬁts under the alternative organizational
forms for diﬀerent values of θ. For the moment, we disregard the possibility that for
48certain very low levels of productivity, the principal may opt to exit the industry rather
t h a nt oe n g a g ee i t h e ram a n a g e ro ras u p p l i e r .
For low values of θ, the constraint s ≥ 0 does not bind in the problem to maximize
Πo,n o rd o e st h ec o n s t r a i n tw ≥ 0 bind in the problem to maximize Πv. For such levels
of productivity, the principal achieves her ﬁrst-best with either organizational form. In
doing so, the guaranteed payment for outsourcing is s∗(θ) and the base wage of a manager
is w∗(θ).W en o t et h a ts∗(θ) >w ∗(θ), because the former includes compensation for the
input costs k and lo, whereas the latter does not.34
With an exponential revenue function, both s∗(θ) and w∗(θ) decline as θ rises. But
w∗ declines faster than s∗,b e c a u s es∗(θ)=w∗(θ)+k+  o(θ),a n d 0 increases with
θ. It follows that the non-negativity constraint on w will bind for some low levels of
productivity at which s∗(θ) > 0.F o r t h e s e v a l u e s o f θ, the principal can achieve her
ﬁrst-best level of operating proﬁts by contracting with an outside supplier but not by
hiring a manager to produce components in house. Outsourcing is the preferred mode of
production for productivity levels in this range.35
Next we show that a principal with very high productivity also prefers to outsource.
For high levels of productivity, the constraint that s ≥ 0 may or may not bind. If it does
not bind, then outsourcing gives the principal her ﬁrst-best level of expected proﬁts while
in-house production does not. Clearly, outsourcing is preferred in this case. Suppose,
instead, that the principal cannot achieve her ﬁrst-best outcome by outsourcing for values
34More speciﬁcally,
s∗(θ)=¯ s + k + ς (θ)+ςe(θ) − h[ςe(θ)]φ[[ςe(θ)]
and
w∗(θ)=¯ s + ςe(θ) − h[ςe(θ)]φ[[ςe(θ)] .
35Note that, as before, Πo(θ)=0for the smallest value of θ such that s∗(θ)=0 . Therefore, the
principal will not engage a supplier or manager for lower levels of productivity than this.
49for θ above some θs.A s θ grows large, the optimal contract for an in-house manager
induces eﬀort of E on all tasks. This leaves the manager with positive rents under our
assumption that h(E)/h0(E)−E>¯ s+k ≥ ¯ s.W i t hem = en = E, the principal chooses a
scale of production that satisﬁes h(E)θR0(θ v)=1 . If the principal were instead to oﬀer
an external supplier a contract with eo = E,  o = lv(θ),a n ds =  v(θ), the entrepreneur
would willingly accept it.36 But such a contract, which is not necessarily the optimal
oﬀer to an external supplier, yields higher expected proﬁts than in-house production by
the amount k.
Finally, we show that if δ is close enough to one and if there exists a θs such that the
principal cannot achieve her ﬁrst-best outcome by outsourcing for θ ≥ θs, then there also
exists an intermediate range of productivity levels at which a principal prefers in-house
production to outsourcing. To see this, suppose that a principal could monitor all of
the activities of a manager of an in-house division. Such a principal could achieve the
ﬁrst-best level of expected proﬁts by specifying em = ςe(θ) and  v = ς (θ) and by setting
a bonus payment that just leaves the manager indiﬀerent between accepting the contract
and not. With perfect monitoring, in-house production clearly would be preferred to
outsourcing in situations where the latter organizational form does not achieve the ﬁrst
best. But expected proﬁts for an integrated ﬁrm are a continuous function of δ.I t
follows that if δ is close enough to one and θ is such that outsourcing does not achieve
the ﬁrst best, then in-house production will be the preferred mode of organization for
the principal.
We conclude that the sorting of ﬁrms by productivity level is qualitatively the same
with a variable scale of production as when the scale is ﬁxed. The least productive
ﬁrms opt to exit the industry. Those with low productivity above a certain threshold
36Under this contract,
s + h(E)φ(E) − E −  v = h(E)/h0(E) − E,
which exceeds ¯ s + k by assumption.
50can make positive expected proﬁts by outsourcing but not by in-house production. Thus,
there is a range of low productivity levels for which outsourcing is the preferred mode
of organization for the principal. Outsourcing also is preferred by the principal when
productivity is suﬃciently high. For an intermediate range of productivity levels, the
principal will opt for in-house production if δ is suﬃciently large.
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